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Love Song for the Life of the Mind: An Essay on the Purpose of Comedy, by Gene 
Fendt. Catholic University of America Press, 2007. Pp. xxvi + 324 pages. 
$74.95.
CHrISTOPHer brUNeLLe, Department of Classics, St. Olaf College.
This is a good book to read. Fendt elegantly reconstructs Aristotle’s lost 
thoughts on comedy, solves the conundrum at the end of Plato’s Sym-
posium, and with serious humor articulates the importance and beauty 
in the works of Plato, Shakespeare, Aristophanes, and Stoppard. Fendt’s 
engaging style may be the best and most important part of his book; just 
as a play’s effect cannot be reduced to a moral message, so a bare list of his 
conclusions (such as one might find in a review) would hardly hint at the 
healthy mental pleasures that one experiences in following him to those 
conclusions.
Fendt begins with an extended, lucid, and persuasive analysis of Aristo-
tle’s odd claim (Poetics 1454a7) that Euripides’ iphigenia in Tauris contains 
the finest kind of tragic pathos. The oddity lies in the fact that this play 
has a happy ending, which we usually associate with comedy or tragicom-
edy; how could iphigenia be a better tragedy than oedipus? Fendt answers 
the question by articulating an emotivist interpretation of Aristotelian ca-
tharsis and mimesis. “Mimesis exceeds cognition by working beneath it 
and before it” (p. 11); hence the emotionality and irrationality of catharsis, 
which depends on mimesis. Poetry is neither a hospital nor a classroom 
(so catharsis is neither ‘purgation’ nor ‘clarification’) but a gymnasium, 
offering us a training ground for our emotions (so catharsis is ‘purifica-
tion’). (Compare Terry Pratchett on the value of fantasy: “Like an exercise 
bicycle it takes you nowhere, but it might just tone up the muscles that 
will.”) Tragic catharsis is thus a useful exercise not just for the emotionally 
infirm but also for the virtuous, whose already “well-ordered emotions 
are given a free and unimpeded run such as the world does not much offer 
as it is” (p. 82). Euripides’ iphigenia offers the most useful kind of catharsis 
to all audiences because its fearful events are imminent rather than com-
pleted (good and evil are still in play, and our passions are raised) and 
its protagonist is both virtuous and innocent (so our concern for her is all 
the stronger); the shape of the plot, then, properly exercises our emotions 
and the happy ending liberates us from an unpleasant feeling of disgust 
(pp. 99–101). Tragedy’s emotional exercise leads its audience to cognitive 
clarity; we benefit from watching Euripides’ Hecuba as king David does 
from hearing Nathan’s story (p. 77) or Prince Hamlet does from hearing 
the speech of Hecuba (pp. 82–83).
Those of us who prefer Euripides to Sophocles will be pleased to see 
the neglected iphigenia championed so strongly. Still, Fendt’s emphasis 
on the emotional power of catharsis and on plot structure alone requires a 
nearly total silence on many other issues, such as Euripidean irony (in the 
audience and between the characters) or the proper use of deus ex machina 
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(contrast iphigenia with orestes) or language itself; there are few quota-
tions from Hecuba and none at all from iphigenia (perhaps I missed one, but 
the book has no index locorum). euripides is unlikely to have been the only 
dramatist to create a tragedy on this plot. The Poetics refers (1455b9–10) to 
a version—probably also a tragedy, to judge from Aristotle’s phrasing—
of Polyides the Sophist. Yet no one has ever dared to claim that Polyides 
might have been the equal of Euripides, because plot, even coupled with 
character, has never seemed sufficient to explain the power of a play. 
Fendt rightly argues against such formalism (pp. 29–31), yet, in focusing 
on the audience’s experience of catharsis, he leaves many of our other 
experiences out of account. (He also occasionally neglects the separation 
between category and example; Aristotle never says that iphigenia has the 
best plot, only that it has the best kind of plot.)
Fendt’s emotivist interpretation of catharsis leads to the central aim 
of the book, the creation and substantiation of an Aristotelian theory of 
comedy. Except for the emotions that they exercise, tragedy and comedy 
are identical in having as their final cause the catharsis of the passions, 
either pity and fear (and similar pains) or sympathy and eros (and similar 
pleasures). Comedy’s aim “is to purify our desires of their murderous de-
ficiencies or ridiculous excesses in eros and sympathy and to enlarge the 
field of our desire and sympathy to include our brother and the fool” (pp. 
188–189). Plato’s Phaedrus is a fine comedy because it produces in us and 
in Phaedrus himself the three effects of relaxation, catharsis, and intellec-
tual pleasure (pp. 155–156). But much finer is As You Like It, because the 
eight protagonists of Shakespeare’s comic community offer a wide array 
of passions (and hence of resolutions and hence of audience catharses), 
because the resolution that spills out from the inset forest of Arden into 
the outer world of the characters so perfectly mimics the resolution that 
ought to spill out from Shakespeare’s play into our own world; and be-
cause the melancholic Jaques, in his final blessing upon and renunciation 
of the completed world of desire, offers “a sublime comic catharsis” (p. 
192), raising us even above the satisfaction of every eros. Here Fendt sees 
a bit of Schopenhauer within Shakespeare—but no Shakespeare within 
Schopenhauer, because comedy and tragedy, being mimetic by nature, 
cannot be reduced to proofs, insights, or morals. Dramas work on the 
emotions, not the mind (p. 132).
The complex relation of drama and morality leads Fendt to some of his 
most worthwhile pages (pp. 206–235). With the help of Aristotle, Kant, 
and the aesthetics of anchovy pizzas, Fendt argues that art can neither be 
reduced to a moral message nor exist for its own amoral sake; rather, “the 
idea that the purpose of dramatic art is catharsis does not require that the 
aesthetic be reduced to the ethical, though it notes that the aesthetic can-
not exist without the ethical” (p. 228). Aristotle begins the Poetics by sepa-
rating poetry from language that makes truth claims, and “since mimeses 
do not aim to represent reality, the impossible (what theoretical reason 
would deny the truth of) is a legitimate poetic trope, so is the immoral 
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(what practical reason would deny the truth of) . . . . The immoral and the 
impossible are legitimate here only because, and only when, they better 
serve the cathartic purpose of the art” (p. 218). Again, mimetic art is a 
crucial tool for the health of the soul, because it provides an emotional 
playground; there, within the play, we can and we must let our passions 
run freely and suffer “in a world without existential import” (p. 174). The 
play is indeed the thing. One cannot treat Shakespeare’s green Arden as a 
template for our own dirty and more difficult world, but “the play shapes 
our desire to include the good of others, and, indeed, our sympathetic 
reaction to the characters begins the practice of that virtue, even if the 
play itself accomplishes nothing further in the so-called real world. If we 
do not have this right desire, or if it is not sufficiently strong or active—if 
we do not take joy in its success—we will never act to achieve that good 
except via force of law” (p. 189). Still, if As You Like It inculcates in its audi-
ence a desire for greater real-world equity (p. 188), it’s hard not to agree at 
least in part with Plato and others who fear art as a tool for social change. 
Those in power usually want to stay there—but the point, Fendt hopes, 
of comedy and tragedy is not to raise the consciousness of the proletariat 
into armed rebellion but through mimetic passion to raise everyone’s con-
sciousness. “The whole society must change, and change its passions—that 
is the point the comic komos makes clear: we are all responsible for the 
whole” (p. 189).
Fendt’s final chapter starts by demonstrating the place of art in political 
society, argues very fetchingly for state support of the arts (p. 255), and 
concludes with a delightful interpretation of Stoppard’s Arcadia, which 
goes beyond anything in Aristophanes, Shakespeare, and perhaps even 
Plato in its catharsis of all the pleasures, even the highest of all: the love 
of the life of the mind. By leaving the best for last, Fendt’s book enacts 
its own teachings; we, having read and appreciated the earlier chapters, 
now desire to see their values endorsed through analysis, and we end up, 
desires satisfied, in Arcadia. Or almost: love of contemplation may outrank 
bodily eros, but if Shakespeare can incorporate physical desire within the 
nobler forms, why would carnal love between Thomasina and Septimus 
harm the admittedly higher love that they already share? C. S. Lewis like-
wise argued that sex is to heaven as chocolate is to sex, but that doesn’t 
mean that lovemaking suffers from Hershey’s Kisses.
Plato ends his Symposium with Socrates claiming that a tragedian can 
also be a comedian, and Fendt ends his book with an epilogue showing 
how this is so: namely, through an emotivist interpretation of catharsis, 
with tragedy purifying our fear and pity, and comedy (including the 
Symposium itself) purifying our desire and sympathy (p. 286). Not that 
Fendt would put it so drily himself; like Plato, his pace is lively and his 
humor is enticing and philosophically persuasive. If you only want one 
juicy interpretation of Plato’s dialogue, these two dozen pages are a fine 
choice; you’ll learn why Alcibiades is truly laughable, why our laughter 
at him is good and healthy (we’re laughing at and thus being freed from 
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the Alcibiades within ourselves), and why our unfulfillable desires and 
human insufficiency may be “our highest perfection. For what is wonder 
but the recognition of incapacity before a beauty that neither judges nor 
condemns?” (p. 301).
My quibbles are mostly minor. The bibliography is by no means ex-
haustive, and in a book with a classical focus I have never before seen an 
index with more references to Rube Goldberg than to Kenneth Dover. Ty-
pos are mainly confined to the short Latin and Greek quotes. Fendt grinds 
his axe too sharp against some critics of Euripidean gender hierarchy (pp. 
93–97); at the end of Hecuba the title character is indeed no role model, but 
Polyxena’s death, through its very courage, can still support the androcen-
tricity of the world. Aristophanes’ Clouds ends not with the usual booze 
and off-color songs but with arson (p. 185), and it is not true that “one 
of the casualties of war was comedy, outlawed from 440 to 437” (p. 148); 
though there seems to have been some Athenian legislation concerning 
comic ridicule of public figures during this period, neither did the genre 
perish nor was Athens at war. Curiously, Aristotle’s reference to certain 
cannibal tribes near the Black Sea (Ne 7.5) is put to vivid use on several 
occasions, yet Fendt never points out that these cannibals may not have 
existed; Aristotle only claims that they are said to exist. By attributing his 
examples to hearsay Aristotle specifically keeps the cannibals in the realm 
of the mimetic (stories are told of such people, and we needn’t think that 
these people exist for their story to be useful), and the distinction between 
the narrated or mimetic world and the outer, lived world is a distinction 
that Fendt himself usually likes to maintain.
But those minor blemishes hardly detract from Fendt’s copious mimetic 
and didactic rewards. Undergraduates may find it hard going, but any 
reader who enjoys extended analytic metaphors, aesthetic optimism, and 
meaningful humor will appreciate the journey and the goal.
